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ABSTRACT
An experiment on children between 2 ; o and 7 ; o showed that they
initially interpret the same X to mean 'same kind' in contexts where it
actually means ' same one'. This led to a critical evaluation of Piaget's im-
plicit contention that young children are using determiners anaphorically.
Stress is placed on the linguistic rather than conceptual component of
children's behaviour in experiments involving questions of the type: Is it
the same X? It is argued that language is not only the tool of intelligence
for representing ongoing cognitive development, but that it is also a
problem area for children within its own right. It is suggested that the
importance of young children's processing procedures on the linguistic
environment has hitherto been underestimated in Piaget's interactive
epistemology.
INTRODUCTION
' (J. at 2 ; 6) That's not a bee, it's a bumble bee. Is it an animal?. But also at
about 2 ; 6 she used the term the slug for the slugs we went to see every
morning along a certain road. At 2 ; 7 she cried: There it is! on seeing
one, and when we saw another ten yards further on she cried: There's the
slug again. I answered, But isn't it another?. J. went back to see the first
one. Is it the same? Yes. Another slug? Yes. Another or the same?.. .The
question obviously had no meaning for J. '
It is not difficult to guess that this is a passage from one of Piaget's early books
(1946; see 1951:225) and, interestingly enough, it is an example to which he
seems attached (Piaget, Sinclair & Vinh Bang 1968: 127). However, those
conversant with Piaget's rich analyses of child behaviour may have found the
last sentence above rather atypical. Did the question really have no meaning
forj?
[•] Our appreciation is extended to the staff and pupils of Pinchat Infants' and Primary
School, Geneva, and to the Creches Communales of Pinchat and Meyrin, Geneva,
for welcoming us into their schools. Warm thanks are extended to E. Dekkers, M.-Ch.
Fabric^, E. Frankel, I. Ott, G. Robert and M. B. Tra for their assistance in data
collection, and to Paul Mengal for his assistance in performing the statistical analyses.
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CHILD LANGUAGE
Within a wide range of experiments designed to study the plurifunctionality
of determiners in child language (KarmilofF-Smith 1976), one was carried out to
analyse young children's comprehension of the words other and same, used ana-
phorically as post-articles giving emphasis to the so-called contrast between the
indefinite and definite articles, a and the. This was completed by a further
experiment on production tasks involving equivalent problems.
First let us briefly look at the articles themselves. A few authors have studied
children's differential use and understanding of the definite and indefinite
articles (Bresson, Bouvier, Damequin, Depreux, Hardy & Platone 1970, Maratsos
1976, Warden 1973, 1976). The results of their experiments and the conclusions
they draw are not, however, mutually reinforcing. Bresson et al. (1970) looked at
production tasks, with a population covering a narrow range of four- and five-
year-olds, where the definite/indefinite distinction depended on the extra-
linguistic context. They confirm that their subjects had no difficulties in pro-
ducing the indefinite article when naming objects. However, the authors show
that when the problem involved using the indefinite article for referring to one
member of a class of identical objects in response to E's question Qwest parti?,
the success rate of four-year-olds was under 50 % of total replies and the figure
dropped to 3 1 % in the case of five-year-olds. In their interpretation of these
findings, Bresson et al. link the difficulties in the use of the non-specific reference
to the child's ongoing cognitive problems in class and relation concepts (Piaget
& Inhelder 1959).
Maratsos (1976) studied the use and understanding of articles in various
linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts, again only covering two age groups,
three- and four-year-olds. In his far-reaching conclusions, he states that, as
early as 3 ; o, children ' obviously produce indefinite NPs to refer GENERiCALLY
or to refer to ANY MEMBER OF A CLASS (our emphasis) in contrast to producing
definite NPs in minimally contrastive situations where a particular referent had
been established for them'. This finding seems to lend support to Brown's
naturalistic data on three children studied longitudinally. He suggests that
' children somewhere between the ages of 32 and 41 months, roughly three years,
do control the specific/non-specific distinction as coded by the articles' (Brown
1973 : 355). Brown none the less adds the proviso that this early productive
control of the article contrast does not yet cover instances where the child is
obliged to take into account his listener's knowledge.
It is this latter aspect of the use of articles and the role of context on which
Warden (1973, 1976) mainly concentrated in an interesting study, developmen-
tally far more extensive than the previous ones mentioned. Contrary to Maratsos,
Warden concludes from his data that for children under 5 ; 0, referring expres-
sions are predominantly definite; that there is inconsistent usage between 5 ; o
and 9 ; o; and full mastery of the indefinite non-specific reference only from 9 ; o.
His explanation resides principally in the child's general cognitive progress
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CHILDRENS UNDERSTANDING OF POST-ARTICLES
from egocentric to non-egocentric perspectives, and on the problem of the dual
function of the indefinite article.
A number of my experiments on French-speaking children between 3 ; o and
12 ; o tally with Warden's results on English-speaking subjects. It is none the
less difficult to pin down full mastery of the various functions of both definite
and indefinite NPs to any one sphere of cognitive development or to any speci-
fic age group. A whole network of general cognitive and specifically linguistic
factors appears to be interrelated. Very much depends on the context of the
utterance, as Warden suggests, but also on whether the articles appear in isolated
sentences or in connected discourse, on the type and tense of the verb, on
the way in which E formulates his questions,1 on the POTENTIAL size of the class
membership various objects/animals may have within the child's world know-
ledge (e.g. marbles versus A wrist-watch) rather than the ACTUAL size of the
class membership in the experimental setting, on topicalization and pre-supposi-
tional interaction between speaker and hearer, as well as on the child's gradual
use and understanding of other functions determiners may have. Children do
endeavour to make clear reference, but they do not rely on the articles for
this (KarmilofF-Smith 1976). The definite/indefinite articles do not seem to be
contrastive terms for the young child. The picture of the plurifunctionality
of determiners is a highly complex one both linguistically and cognitively,
which a narrow age span, or concentration on the articles to the exclusion
of other means language offers for making reference, may only partially bring
forth.
Much of the experimental work in the field of determiners has been concen-
trated on production tasks. Comprehension tasks, where they have been used,
often gave rise to unsatisfactory results or were based on highly unnatural
experimental items which, as Brown (1973) put it, 'place a somewhat unusual
communication burden' on the indefinite article. Maratsos (1976), for instance,
devised a series of comprehension tasks based on the following model: ' X acted
on one of the Ys. . .suddenly (the/a) Y performed another action'. 'The Y'
entailed that the child act on the SAME Y as the one in the initial NP, 'a Y'
entailing that he act on one of the OTHER YS present. Warden (1973) used a
somewhat similar design within an extra-linguistic context. He presented chil-
dren with pairs of pictures containing three identical Xs and one X odd-man-out
(e.g. different colour, different hat, etc.). Instructions were' Show me A (nonsense
modifer) X ' which entailed pointing to any one of the identical Xs, or ' Show me
THE (nonsense modifier) X', implying the one that was the only member of its
sub-class. The interesting results of these two studies none the less raise an im-
portant question. When we experiment in language, particularly when we place
[1] Such differences as Who did it?I What did I hide? implying a simple NP response, as
compared to the more neutral What happened?, implying a full sentence, gave rise to
different article usage in young subjects.
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unusual communicative burdens on certain morphemes, are we observing the
child's normal language-processing procedures or are we observing ad hoc
experiment-generated procedures? Such criticism can, of course, be levelled at
aspects of my own work. Indeed, it can be shown that the procedures children use
for isolated sets of sentences are not necessarily the same as those used when
analogous stimuli are inserted into connected discourse (Karmiloff-Smith 1976).
In the particular area of articles, semantic distinctions of the type mentioned in
the above two experiments would not, in my view, be made solely on the article
distinction in natural language usage, but rather by adding contrastive expressions
such as the same X, another X, the only X, one of the Xs, or by other means such
as intonational stress, pronominalization, and so forth. The production task
was designed to look at how children organize the various linguistic means for
making such contrasts, and whether they place the semantic burden on the
article contrast alone.
Since the experimental tasks were carried out on French-speaking children, it
may be useful to indicate briefly where French and English differ slightly in
their use of the words mime and same. Clearly there are many intricate nuances of
meaning which cannot be developed in this article, where we shall merely stress
one or two points.
If a French-speaking child discovers an object similar to one he possesses, he
might exclaim: j'ai le mime (meaning literally 'I've got the same'), or j'ai la
mime if the name of the object has feminine gender. The more logical but less
usual expression would be fen at un mime (literally, ' I've of them a same'). An
English-speaking child in similar circumstances would be likely to say something
like I've got one the same. In both languages, however, samejmeme has two func-
tions: the descriptor function meaning 'same kind', i.e. members of the same
class (e.g. Jane is wearing the same dress as Mary), and the determiner function
meaning ' same one', i.e. the same element within a class (e.g. Jane is wearing the
same dress as yesterday). There are of course cases which are ambiguous (e.g.
He is using the same argument as last year), but this is often disambiguated by
adding such expressions as practically the same or exactly the same. Both English
and French are similar in their anaphoric uses of samejmeme in sentences of the
following type: une limace.. .et la mime limace.. ./a slug.. .and the same slug...
(clearly meaning 'same one'), as contrasted to .. .et une autre limace/.. .and
another slug (meaning ' another one').
The hypothesis that ensues is that if, as Maratsos (1976) maintains, the small
child is capable of distinguishing the specific/non-specific reference solely on the
differences between two unaccentuated morphemes (the articles), then it should
be even easier for such a contrast to be understood if the articles' meanings are
emphasized by the addition of the post-articles same and other. Although it
remains to be seen what their real functions are in early child language, the
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words same, other, and the articles do all appear very early in corpora (Guillaume
1927, Warden 1973, Brown 1973, Karmiloff-Smith 1976).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The contexts were as follows:
(t) completely identical objects (e.g. blue plastic ducks, green toy Volkswagens,
etc.);
(it) objects of the same class differing only in colour (e.g. blue or pink plastic
lambs, red or blue toy Fords, etc.);
(MI) objects of the same class but differing by several parameters (e.g. brown-
wooden-standing cow versus white-plastic-seated cow, small-open-red-sports
car versus large-white-saloon car, etc.);
(iv) objects the only members of their class (e.g. a horse, a truck, a toy watch,
etc.).
There were six basic situation types using very familiar objects such as the above,
together with a girl doll and a boy doll. The child was asked to act out a series of
sentences of the following design, where in sentence type («) the key word is in
object position, e.g. the girl pushes an X and then the boy pushes (the same/
another) X, and in sentence type (b) the key word is in subject position, e.g.
an X bumps into the girl and then (the same/another) X bumps into the boy.
Examples of task items are as follows (context type (»)):
Context
Identical
objects
E's utterance
(a) The girl pushes a X and then
the boy pushes THE SAME X
(6) An X pushes the girl and then
THE SAME X pushes the boy
(a) The boy pushes an X and then
the girl pushes ANOTHER X
(6) An X pushes the boy and then
ANOTHER X pushes the girl
Child's expected response
Action on one X
Action on one X
Action on two Xs
Action on two Xs
Context types (ii)-(iv) followed exactly the same pattern.
Simple sentences (e.g. the ducks fall off the table) were interspersed amongst
test sentences as fillers to avoid lack of concentration due to somewhat repetitious
forms. Whenever necessary, test sentences were repeated. Although certain basic
items were presented to all children, we also used the Genevan exploratory
method to analyse responses in more depth. This method involves constantly
forming hypotheses regarding the reason for a child's response and not merely
recording responses. Hypotheses were tested on the spot by, say, placing in-
tonational stress on the post-articles, by reducing or increasing the number and
type of objects present at one time, by adding such expressions as the same X as
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the boy just pushed, by using somewhat unusual forms such as a same X, by en-
couraging children to talk about similar objects they possessed, and so forth.2
Emphasis was less on success or failure to interpret the same X as ' same one'
but on the functions such expressions may be playing at a given level and on how
transitions take place. Only the basic items were included in the quantitative
analysis of the results; the exploratory part of the experiment provided revealing
clues for the qualitative analysis.
The comprehension task involved 47 children between the ages of 2 ; 10 and
7; 11. These children were not selected at random but from the results of two
previous experiments on gender acquisition where they had proved to be typical
of their age group. Any linguistically very advanced three-year-old, for example,
was not included. However, results can either be grouped by age, as in the pres-
ent case because of pre-selection, or can be grouped according to response
patterns where overlapping of ages occurs. In the results, stress is not placed on
the actual AGES of the different interpretations, but rather the ORDER of change
from one interpretation to the other. Within each sub-collection of items, each
child's behaviour was very consistent.
The production task had a similar contextual design to the comprehension
task, except that E acted out with toys and asked children to describe the actions
to a second experimenter. This was conducted on another, randomly selected
group of 61 subjects between 3 ; o and 11 ; 1.
RESULTS
This paper will mainly confine itself to the results of the comprehension task.
In the discussion, however, reference will be made to aspects of the results of
the production task (to be reported at length elsewhere) when they are particu-
larly relevant to the interpretation of the comprehension task results.
Table 1 gives a summary of the comprehension task results, expressed as a
precentage of the total number of responses to basic items per situation type for
each age group. This is expressed in percentages to facilitate comparisons, al-
though of course the calculations of statistical significance levels were made on
the actual frequencies. No distinction has been made between the subject and
object positions of the post-articles (sentence types (a) and (b)), the difference in
the results being insignificant, although very slightly in favour of correct 'same
one' responses first occurring for same in object position.3
It should be noted that the columns labelled 'hesitations' represent the
[2] We had purposely bought our experimental toys in a popular local supermarket in the
hope that children might make spontaneous utterances about analogous objects they
possessed.
[3] Here, and throughout the following discussion, we cite the English forms same, other,
etc. although their French counterparts were of course used in the test.
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percentage of the' same one' responses (previous column) which were clearly pre-
ceded by lengthy hesitations not apparent elsewhere in the child's behaviour.
This table is intended to give a picture of the overall trend. It is in fact more the
qualitative analysis of the results, incorporating children's spontaneous utter-
ances, that is more revealing as to the functions same and other have for young
children.
From a quantitative point of view, the results show that order of change of
interpretation from ' same kind' to ' same one' is very significantly a function of
age (i.e. development) and of the extralinguistic context within each age group
(X2=424i, d.f.= i2, P < o-ooi).
j The initial comprehension procedure (i.e. until around 550) is to interpret
the same X as meaning another X with the same attributes and not as meaning one
and the same X. Only if attributes differ considerably does the young child
gradually interpret the same X to mean ' same one'. A different picture emerges
from the situations in which sentences contain another X, although something
of the pattern registered with same is also apparent here. Where class members'
attributes differ, all age groups were successful in almost 100% of instances in
interpreting 'another X' to mean 'another one'. Children over 4 ; o did as well
in situations where all Xs were identical. Interestingly enough, where Xs were
identical, some three-year-olds tended to interpret another X as meaning
'another kind' rather than 'another one' and thus refused to act out a number
of the sentences referring to identical contexts. In contrast, no refusals were
registered with these subjects for sentences containing other when objects differed
in colour. What was observed with these three-year-olds for other thus seems
rather similar to what took place developmentally with same. In an attempt
to track down more about other and the two functions it has, a group of two-year-
olds were interviewed; but the data are inconclusive in view of the unsuitability
of the comprehension task with such small children. It is none the less interesting
to note that, although concerned with somewhat different problems, Donaldson
& Wales (1970) showed that small children first interpret the word different to
mean 'different kind' rather than 'different one', which tallies with what is
suggested by our results on three-year-olds regarding other used anaphorically.
As pointed out by Clark (1970), the technique used by the above authors did not
allow for verification of the child's possible alternative interpretation of same. How-
ever, Donaldson & Wales' results on different, used exophorically for direct refer-
ence to the extralinguistic situation, point to very similar general developmental
trends compared to the present results on same and other used anaphorically.
Let us now take a more qualitative look at the results for each age group. As
was seen in the table, three-year-olds interpret same to mean ' same kind' and
act out test sentences of the type the boy pushed a cow and then the girl pushed the
same cow by touching TWO identical cows, when context permitted, or by
frequently refusing to act out if objects were not identical. They persisted in this
384
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behaviour even if items were repeated and the word same accentuated unnaturally,
or if we added expressions such as . . .the same cow as the boy just touched. These
small children often accompanied their refusals to act out by such comments as :
She can't push the same, you didn't put out another cow like that one; There's not
the same duck, only a blue one; Which car? That one is not the same. Similar com-
ments were even more numerous when the attributes of class members differed
significantly or when there was only one class member. Although the three-year-
olds interpreted other correctly provided there was some difference between
class members, the 39 % of refusals to items containing other if Xs were identical
is particularly striking. Here, too, children accompanied their refusals to act out
the item.. .and the boy caressed another dog by stating: Which dog? That one?
But it's the same; I can't do it, They're all the same; There's not another balloon,
They're all green.
To summarize for three-year-olds: same is clearly interpreted as meaning
'same kind' and other is often interpreted as meaning 'other kind'. Both of
these expressions seem to be interpreted in their descriptor function, i.e. as
modifiers telling the child about class attributes, and not in their determiner
function, i.e. as post-articles restricting the extension of a class in discourse
(in this case to a singleton).
We turn now to the four-year-olds. It is within this age group that the begin-
nings of transition were to be witnessed. Although there remained a high per-
centage of incorrect responses to same in the identical situation, in the more
exploratory part of the interviews we were often able to change certain responses
to correct ones by stressing the post-article or by adding. . .same X as the boy
just pushed. It will be recalled that this was not possible with most three-year-
olds. Correct interpretations (' same one') could also be provoked for some four-
year-olds when we alternated recursively singleton X situations with those
containing identical Xs. Comparing four-year-olds to three-year-olds in situa-
tions where Xs were similar, it can be seen that the percentage of incorrect
responses has greatly increased for the older children. This is due to the complete
disappearance of refusals to act out. In other words, although same is still in-
terpreted to mean 'same kind', four-year-olds no longer consider it necessary
for all attributes to be identical. It was when class members' attributes differed
greatly, forming obvious sub-classes for the child, that a significant increase was
witnessed in correct ' same one ' interpretations; these responses were none the
less preceded by lengthy hesitations, as if there was a conflict for the child
between the competing interpretations 'same one ' and 'same kind'. Another
interesting fact occurred occasionally during the exploratory part of the inter-
view. To a question comparing a red plastic duck to a blue plastic duck, some
children replied no when asked is it the same? but yes when asked is it the same
duck? It may well be that the relations between article, post-article and noun and
their respective positions in the N P play an important role in these different
26 385 J C L
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interpretations, a point to be expanded in the discussion. Items containing other
posed no problems whatsoever for four-year-olds.
In summary, four-year-olds clearly interpret other as meaning 'other one',
i.e. in its function of post-article determiner, whereas same is still significantly
interpreted in its descriptor function meaning ' same kind' and only conflictual
situations provoked over 50 % successful' same one' interpretations.
Five-year-olds registered a very significant change in success rate. They were
clearly interpreting same to mean 'same one', although in situations where Xs
were identical or similar, many hesitations preceded correct responses, parti-
cularly for the first few experimental items. This was not the case with the
children over 6 ; o. Thus it can be said that from 5, but more systematically from
6, children can interpret both same and other as post-article determiners.
Finally, it is to be noted that while both same and other were successfully
interpreted by children over 5 ; o, the majority of these children were not success-
ful above chance level in a control experiment to test comprehension of anaphoric
the as opposed to a but WITHOUT the addition of same and other. It can therefore
be assumed that their interpretation in this experiment is based on the post-
articles and not on the articles alone.
DISCUSSION
How should we interpret these results? Should the burden of explanation be
placed on the child's general cognitive development or more specifically on the
progress of, say, identity concepts (Piaget et al. 1968)? Should an explanation
be sought in the fact that three-year-olds are particularly concerned with resem-
blances and differences? Or is there something essentially linguistic at work?
How do children cope with flow of linguistic input and the fact that one surface
expression may be fulfilling more than one function?
Initially, children seem to prefer to opt for a single function, or if they do use
two different functions, these are isolated for the child and he is not aware that
they are covered by the same surface marker (Karmiloff- Smith, in the Press).
As children begin to notice that one expression may have two or more functions
or to introduce relations between isolated existing functions, there is a tendency
to overmark a function on several sentence elements (e.g. possessive determiner
function overmarked as in mon mien de chapeau a mot) or to create new, and
often slightly ungrammatical forms to differentiate the functions. In the present
experiment, for instance, there were some revealing differences in the spontaneous
utterances of the population. Most three- and four-year-olds, as well as some
children at all ages, tended to exclaim: moij'ai le mime (meaning: 'I've got the
same') upon seeing one of the task objects. What was interesting, however, was
a somewhat ungrammatical form encountered in the experiment only in children
over 5 ; o and which bears witness to their attempt to introduce into language
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the distinction that they have made between ' same kind' and same one'. These
children when noticing one of the task objects would exclaim: moij'ai la meme
de vache or moij'ai une de meme de vaches (literally:' I've got the same of cow' or
' I've got one of the same of cows'). Here, they seem to want to express' same kind'
in using la meme de or une de meme de but at the same time avoid the correct,
economic expression la mime used by younger children (and by adults for both
functions). The children have implicitly understood le meme or la mime as
meaning ' same one' and created a separate expression for ' same kind'. In one of
our other experiments on the articles, children made clear distinction in their
spontaneous descriptions between j'ai une vache ('I have a cow'), i.e. the in-
definite in its non-specific reference function, and j'ai une de vache (' I have one
cow'), i.e. an ungrammatical form to cover the numeral function.4
These very logical yet ungrammatical forms, as well as ' over-marking', tend
to disappear once the child implicitly allows for one expression to have more
than one function depending on the context of the utterance. However, it should
be stressed that the temporary creation of such forms has the very positive
function of enabling the child to consolidate and render stable the two separate
meanings. If the child were slipping back and forth between the two functions of
one surface expression, it would be difficult for him to get a ' grip' on either
meaning. The same applies to the way in which the child copes with the physical
environment: only by overgeneralizing his ' theories-in-action', by seeking con-
firmation rather than falsification, can the child master one aspect of the causal
relationships and thus be able to recognize counter-examples (Karmiloff-Smith,
in the Press). If one were consistantly taking new information into account, or
slipping to and fro between competing theories, there would probably be no
theories in the first place. The assimilatory function of sensory-motor action
schemes can be viewed in a similar way.
Not only the post-articles but also both the definite and indefinite articles have
several functions. My other experiments and case studies on determiners in-
dicate that the initially predominant function of the definite article seems to be
deictic, i.e. signalling the presence of a singular object or the actions of one salient
object extracted from a group of others, within the EXTRALINGUISTIC context.
This deictic function of the definite article (sometimes used correctly when the
object is alone, and other times incorrectly in the case of non-specific reference) is
clearly quite different from an anaphoric INTRALINGUISTIC function. On the
other hand, the initially predominant function of the indefinite article appears to
be that of giving the NAME of an object, accompanied by a demonstrative or the
copula, and not that of non-specific reference. This appears to be borne out by
naturalistic data (Bloom 1970) and by Warden's experiments on English-speaking
children (Warden 1976).
[4] French does not differentiate between 'a' and 'one', using for both functions the
homonym un (or its feminine counterpart une).
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Bearing in mind these initially predominant functions of the definite and
indefinite articles for the three-year-old, let us take another look at 'the slug'!
What did J really mean when she exclaimed to Piaget encore la limace and replied
affirmatively that it was simultaneously both the same slug and another one
(Piaget 1946)? When naming things, J easily and correctly used the indefinite
article (e.g. That's not a bee, It's a bumble bee, etc.). It would thus appear that her
intention was NOT to give the name of the mollusc, which was already presup-
posed, shared knowledge between her and her father. Let us translate her
utterance as ' again the slug' which is closer to the original French encore la
limace, although of course the English book translation (' there's the slug again')
is the more colloquial rendering. Encore in French can mean ' again' or ' other'.
Encore un biscuit means 'another biscuit'. As mentioned, several investigators
have confirmed that young children use a definite referring expression, e.g. the
X, to refer to any one of a group of objects when it has not yet been made
previously salient either extralinguistically or by linguistic reference. In such cases,
older children use an indefinite referring expression, e.g. an X, one of the Xs, or
a demonstrative that X, but not the definite article, which presupposes previous
verbal reference or shared implicit referential knowledge. For small children,
the definite article clearly seems to be deictic and not anaphoric. They say
the slug is crawling on the table even when several other slugs are VISIBLY present.
Thus J may have been saying something like ' another the slug', encore referring
to class extensional aspects (another one), whereas the definite article, la, was
deictic and singled out the mollusc's presence in the extralinguistic context.
Indeed, with verbs such as regarder (e.g. 'look at the slug') the use of the de-
finite article is correct. When J walked back to look at the first slug before
answering Piaget's question, it is conceivable that she was not checking whether
it was the same ONE but rather whether it was the same KIND. Piaget's question
may thus have been very meaningful to J in that for the child under 5; o
'another slug' (another one) can indeed be simultaneously 'the same' (same
kind).
The point to be stressed - though it merely touches on one aspect of Piaget's
rich analyses of sensory-motor and preoperational intelligence - is that neither
the definite article in the slug, nor the pronoun in J's exclamation there it is! are
necessarily anaphoric. The child's intention in using such terms may initially
be predominantly exophoric and deictic, making essentially extralinguistic
reference. It only seems anaphoric to the observer who is connecting the child's
discourse and interpreting it intralinguistically. It is quite plausible that for the
small child there may be one procedure for naming, i.e. copula+indefinite
article, and another, quite separate procedure for talking about one object's
presence or behaviour, i.e. definite article+verb. It may well be, as suggested
by some of our data on gender pronoun reference (Karmiloff-Smith 1975), that
young children do not really use anaphora, and that their discourse is not simul-
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taneously connected syntactically and semantically, even though it may appear
to be so to the investigator.
Piaget makes a very interesting analysis of J's use of the term the slug. He
suggests that the child is looking upon the two slugs, not as different members of
the class of slugs, but as successive reappearances of a single member, a sort of
semi-individual, semi-generic prototype (Piaget 1946). Although this rich inter-
pretation may reflect conceptual development at some early level, basing the
particular hypothesis solely on the child's use of determiners is tenuous, to the
extent that the syntactico-semantic FUNCTIONS of expressions in child language
do not necessarily coincide with those of adults. The child's use of the definite
article may initially be quite devoid of any anaphoric intention and be purely
deictic. In another experiment, we noticed that small children frequently accom-
panied the definite article with pointing gestures, which they did not do when
using the indefinite article. Indeed, in many languages the definite article devel-
oped diachronically from the demonstrative.
The results of the production experiment concerning actions on same X or on
another X clearly show that at all ages children do not place solely on the article
contrast, or on a pronoun, the burden of anaphoric reference in contexts where
ambiguity of reference might occur. The indefinite article alone is practically
never used to convey that a second action took place on another X. Nor is the
definite article alone used to convey that a second action took place on the same
X when more than one identical X is present. In such cases, children attempted
to make anaphoric reference by other linguistic marks and even by multiple
' overmarking', e.g. The girl pushed a dog and then also the boy re-pushed again
the same dog (instead of the simpler The girl pushed a dog and then the boy
pushed the dog/it). The definite article alone was only used in cases of no possible
ambiguity of reference, i.e. where only one X was present, and in such instances
it is probable that the definite article is functioning deictically.
The results of the comprehension task showing children's changing interpre-
tation of same necessarily raise questions with respect to the role of language in
investigating conceptual progress. Whilst recognizing that certain syntactico-
semantic expressions must necessarily be used when experimenting with child-
ren, it may be that the verbal component of experiments has played a somewhat
more crucial role than Piaget explicitly suggests. It would, for instance, be very
difficult to devise experiments to study identity concepts and yet avoid the use
of articles and the words same and other. Indeed, when Piaget et al. (1968)
studied the problems of the epistemology and psychology of identity, they carried
out a series of experiments all of which involved, after spatial rotations, etc. of
an object, experimenter-questions of the type: Is it the same drop of water?, Is it
the same square?, and so forth. Piaget et al. describe four developmental levels
(1968: 5) in identity concepts: (z) a tendency to accept identity; (ii) a refusal
to accept identity; (in) acceptance of identity of the object itself but not
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of its quantitative properties; and (iv) a quantitative identity, i.e. conserva-
tion.
First of all, it is noteworthy that although the levels (t) and (Hi) both accept
identity of the object, Piaget suggests that their identical responses have a
different cognitive status, based on his overall knowledge of the child's developing
concepts. It is, however, the distinction between levels (i) and («) which we
should like briefly to discuss, as they pertain to the LINGUISTIC component of
the tasks. Three- to four-year-olds, when asked Is it the same square? reply in
the affirmative. Piaget suggests this is due to their ignoring the transformations
involved. Four- to five-year-olds give a negative reply to the same question,
because they take the transformations into account. Hence Piaget's two levels.
However, if we consider that the expression the same X is interpreted by young-
est children as a modifier, and not as a determiner, in situations where there are
objects with identical attributes, their affirmative reply could be interpreted to
mean 'same kind', i.e. 'ANOTHER square with similar attributes'. For four- to
five-year-olds, already interpreting in privileged contexts the same X as a post-
article determiner meaning 'same one', the question will receive a negative
reply but also mean ' another square'. Thus, when analysed from the point of
view of the functions these expressions have in child language, the opposite
replies of the two above groups of children may actually have the same
cognitive status of non-identity. The two levels distinguished by Piaget may in
fact be one level, since children have understood E's question in two different
ways.
We have seen how cautious Piaget is to avoid misinterpreting the similar
responses of two different developmental levels as having the same cognitive
status. However, the converse also holds true. Children may be giving different
verbal responses which in fact have the same conceptual status. It seems clear
that with development children tend to endow linguistic terms such as the same
X with different functions, irrespective of the particular conceptual task in
which they are being questioned. It is therefore suggested that language is an
important experimental variable, a fact that has hitherto been underestimated in
Piagetian research.
It still remains to be explained why, in our language experiment, three-year-
old children take.. .and the girl pushes the same cow to mean 'same kind' whereas
children over 5 ; o (and adults) all take it to mean ' same one'. We have suggested
hypotheses as to why the child opts for one possible meaning rather than the
two simultaneously, but not yet why the child chooses ' same kind' rather than
' same one'. In our experiment, there are no spatial rotations, etc. that render the
situation conceptually difficult in any way. Indeed, the identity concept involved
would be of the most primitive type, i.e. object permanency (Piaget 1936),
which is acquired before the onset of language and is considered to be, among
other things, a prerequisite for it (Sinclair 1971). It would therefore be difficult
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to interpret the results of the three-year-olds on the basis of conceptual devel-
opment in identity. Cognitively, it would seem to be equally difficult, if not more
so, to make the comparison between two objects and judge them as ' the same'
(kind), as to look upon one object as retaining its identity, particularly when no
spatial or other transformations have taken place. Is it that the three-year-old
is simply more obsessed at this stage of development with similarities of attri-
butes and thus interprets the linguistic expression as referring to this ? This may
be part of the explanation.
I should, however, like to suggest a more essentially linguistic hypothesis to
explain the results. It may be that children are implicitly basing their interpre-
tation ' same kind' on the position of the word same—particularly its relationship
to the other words in the NP. This obviously does not mean to imply that there
is any EXPLICIT metalinguistic activity dividing words into adult classes of articles,
adjectives and nouns! But just as the child generalizes patterns in his physical
environment, he does likewise in his linguistic environment (Ervin 1964, Klima
& Bellugi 1966), and this may not be merely aimed at expressing semantic
intentions. It has been suggested elsewhere that the child's processing procedures
on both linguistic and physical environments are very similar (Karmiloff-Smith
& Inhelder 1975). Thus there may be implicit classificatory activity going on in
the child's cognitive processing of the linguistic input, linking such words as
big, small, yellow, pretty and same, because they occur together in an intonational
chunk with article and noun: the big cow, the same cow. This is why it was par-
ticularly illustrative to note that when asked to compare one of two ducks to the
other, the child replied in the affirmative when asked Is it the same duck ? but when
asked Is it the same? the reply was negative. It could be that when the question in-
volves same only accompanied by an article, the word same has a different function
than when it is inserted between article and noun and looks more like a modifier.
The following trend is hypothesized: first the child makes an NP chunk based
on intonational patterns or on something along the lines of Bever's (1970)
'perceptual segmentation'. Then the child breaks down that global chunk into
one, two or three slots based on surface structure input patterns: one slot for
little words that go with names of things (determiner); one slot for words which
tell us about the thing (modifier); and one slot for the name (noun). The modifier
slot would be filled with words like big, little, pretty and same. The hypothesis
is that the initial choice of interpretation ' same kind' is due to the fact that it
matches the classificatory system and the modifier slot position.5 Simultaneously
the child may frequently confirm his ' theory' in that ' same kind' interpretations
[5] Whilst this is an attractive hypothesis, same does not appear to exhibit all modifier
behavioural patterns. As D. Crystal (personal communication) has pointed out, one does
not encounter errors of the type samer or samest either in English or in French. How-
ever, the absence of such errors does not necessarily weaken the hypothesis in that the
very semantics of ' same kind' already implies the comparative. As one child put i t . . .
if it's already the same, then it can't be more than that.
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are more consistent in the linguistic input since 'same one' meanings are often
replaced by pronominalization, etc. But gradually the actual semantics of the
word same would be more clearly developing into the two functions:' same kind'
and 'same one', particularly from instances where the 'same one' meaning is
unambiguous. The lengthy hesitations in the transition period and the fact that
initial correct responses occur when attributes differ significantly tends to in-
dicate that there may subsequently be a conflict between two competing systems:
two semantic functions of same versus its syntactic relations with the other
constituents of the NP. The final understanding in this context of same as mean-
ing ' same one' may be considerably helped by the child's more explicit under-
standing and use of' other', whereby another X covers the meaning ' same kind'
and thus frees same in such circumstances for the meaning ' same one'. Lastly,
another important factor is that small children seem to use language exophori-
cally in reference to the extralinguistic context, rather than anaphorically, and
this probably also affects the younger child's preferred interpretation of 'same
kind'.
Do such young children really develop processing procedures to deal with the
patterns and relations observable in the linguistic environment? Are they not
confined to communicating their semantic intentions? In his frames model,
Minsky (1975) has suggested that' since meaning of utterance is encoded as much
in the positional and structural relations between words as in the word choices
themselves, there must be processes concerned with analyzing those relations'.
A study on the acquisition of the gender opposition in French (Karmiloff-Smith
1975) points to the fact that as early as 3 ; 0 the child creates a phonological
procedure to classify noun suffixes and that he can systematically apply this to
entirely new nonsense words. It was found that the child bases himself from this
very early age on the more formal, phonological aspects of language rather than
on the more general cognitive clues (e.g. difference between the sexes in natural
gender). This, and the results of the present study, suggest that language is not
merely 'the tool of intelligence' for representing ongoing cognitive development
(Piaget 1968), but is actually for the child a problem area within its own right.
Suggestions have been made elsewhere (Karmiloff-Smith, in the Press) re-
garding a tentative model for the interplay of children's conservation-seeking
strategies in language acquisition, inspired by Piaget's interactive epistemology
and by recent artificial intelligence approaches to language phenomena (e.g.
Minsky 1975, Schank 1972). In the previous paper I suggested that children
may introduce some of the earliest grammatical markers such as the articles, not
for communicative purposes, but FOR THEMSELVES as part of their processing
procedures on the linguistic problem area. The use of word order, for instance,
conveys semantic intentions. It does not give a separate, stable identity to each
constituent of the utterance but a relative one through their ordered relation-
ship. The initial attaching of articles (and perhaps verb inflections) may be
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classificatory in nature and part of child's organization of auditory input. It
permits certain predictions about what is to follow and enables the child to
classify linguistically in a way which is different to his conceptual distinction
between actions and things, in that actions can also be nouns. Cellerier (personal
communication) has suggested that repeated RE-PARTITIONING of the same
environment (physical, linguistic, etc.) may have a very basic, dynamic function
in development generally.
Piaget's epistemology is essentially built on the growing child's logico-
mathematical interaction with an ever-extending physical environment. It can be
argued that Piaget has underestimated the importance of children's constructive
interaction with their other environments, such as the linguistic one.
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